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        In this paper we examine how incumbents respond to the threat of entry by a competitor.  
Though this topic has been the object of considerable theoretical and policy debate, it has 
received little empirical attention, mainly due to the problems of identifying the threat of entry 
separately from actual entry. 
        We will examine this issue in the passenger airline industry.  We are able to identify 
discrete shifts in the threat of entry in this circumstance by using the expansion patterns of the 
industry’s most famous potential competitor—Southwest Airlines.
1  In particular, we look at 
situations where Southwest begins or even announces it will begin operating in the second 
endpoint airport of a route (having already been operating out of the first endpoint), but before it 
starts flying the route itself.  We investigate how incumbents respond to such threats. 
  As an illustrative example, consider Southwest’s entry into Washington Dulles 
International Airport.  On October 5, 2006, Southwest began operations at Dulles (IAD) with 
nonstop flights to four other cities in its network, and one-stop service to several others.  One 
route Southwest did not offer service on immediately upon entering Dulles was IAD-Cleveland 
(CLE).  Cleveland is a Southwest airport; the airline flew between CLE and other airports, just 
not the CLE-IAD route.  But once Southwest announced and then began operating out of both 
endpoints on the route—CLE first and now IAD—we might expect that competitors understand 
that the probability that Southwest would soon start flying the route itself rose dramatically.  We 
will document that operating in both endpoints is correlated with a probability of entering the 
route around 70 times higher than other routes.  With that increase in probability, we can then 
look at, say, United and Continental Airlines’ (the incumbents) fares on the CLE-IAD route 
                                                 
1 Southwest’s network has been expanding rapidly for some time and the impact of their actual entry on prices in a 
market is well documented (see, for example, Morrison [2001]). 
  1when faced with the threat of Southwest's entry by looking at prices around the time Southwest 
starts operations in the second endpoint airport, but has yet to actually start flying.
2 
  The paper builds on the extensive literature on airline competition, especially the work 
relating to airport presence and the sources of airline market power.  Most of these papers have 
not looked at preemptive actions or the threat of entry but rather at market behaviors after entry 
occurs.
3  Our empirical strategy is perhaps closest to Whinston and Collins’ (1992) study of the 
impact on incumbents’ stock prices of announcements of People Express’s impending (actual) 
entry into particular routes. 
  The paper provides an empirical setting for testing the considerable body of theoretical 
work on strategic entry deterrence and accommodation, particularly that offering rationale for 
preemptive action.  These include, for example, Dixit’s (1979) capacity commitment story, the 
strategic learning-by-doing of Spence (1981), cost-signaling as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982), 
Aghion and Bolton’s (1987) long-term contracting environment, and switching costs as in 
Klemperer (1987) and Farrell and Klemperer (2004).  These rationales were put forward to 
counter the traditional argument that preemptive action is irrational, either because it is not 
subgame perfect (in the spirit of Selten’s [1978] chain-store paradox), or because costly 
competitive actions should be delayed until entry actually occurs. 
Our primary results indicate that incumbents in the airline industry do respond to the 
threat of entry.  Incumbents drop average fares substantially when Southwest threatens a route 
(before Southwest actually starts flying the route).  This is true even when we compare the fare 
                                                 
2 We use the IAD example for purposes of illustration.  It occurred too recently to be included in our actual sample. 
3 Examples include Reiss and Spiller (1989); Hurdle et al. (1989); Borenstein (1989, 1991, 1992); Berry (1990, 
1992); Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992); Whinston and Collins (1992); Evans and Kessides (1993); Borenstein 
and Rose (1994); Peteraf and Reed (1994); Hendricks Piccione, and Tan (1997); Mayer and Sinai (2003), and 
Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2004) 
  2changes on threatened routes to those on incumbents’ other routes out of the same airports, 
suggesting that shifts in airport-specific operating costs are not driving the results.  The lower 
prices, in turn, appear to increase the number of passengers flying on the incumbents prior to 
entry.  We also find, interestingly, that while incumbents cut fares on the directly threatened 
route, they do not cut prices on routes to nearby airports in the same market (e.g., no cuts on the 
Chicago-O'Hare route when Southwest threatens a Chicago-Midway route). 
Going beyond the fact of preemptive action, we also present suggestive evidence on the 
explanation for preemptive fare cuts.  The evidence of an entry deterrence motive is mixed.  We 
find little support for strategic investment/excess capacity theories of preemptive action: there is 
at best weak evidence that airlines add capacity in response to entry threats.  Consistent with 
deterrence, on the other hand, is that on routes where Southwest’s entry is guaranteed, and 
deterrence therefore not possible, incumbents do not appear to cut prices sharply before actual 
entry occurs.  However, we do not have enough statistical power to reject that they make the 
same price cuts as on threatened routes.  
 
II. Data 
  We build the core of our sample from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s DB1A 
files from the first quarter of 1993 through the final quarter of 2004.  These data provide a 10% 
sample of all domestic tickets in each quarter.  From these, average logged ticket prices and the 
logged total number of passengers within each route-carrier-quarter combination are constructed 
(unfortunately the data do not report specific travel dates within the quarter).
4  We define a route 
by its two endpoint airports and we look at so-called “direct flights” on a route.  (Direct flights 
                                                 
4 We use Severin Borenstein’s cleaned files, which are already aggregated up to the route-carrier-quarter level, since 
this is the level of our analysis rather than the individual ticket.  Note that because the DB1A data is a ten percent 
random sample of all tickets, our observed passenger counts will be one-tenth that of actual traffic on average. 
  3are predominantly nonstop flights, but technically also include itineraries where the passenger 
stops but does not change planes.)  We restrict our core sample to routes between the 59 airports 
that Southwest ever flies any flights to in our sample. 
  The threatened entry events we study are identified from the observed expansion patterns 
of Southwest Airlines.  Southwest grew tremendously over our sample period, with its revenue 
and passenger volumes almost tripling from $2.3 to $6.5 billion and from 18.8 to 53.4 billion 
passenger-miles.  It also added service to 22 new airports.
5
  Every time Southwest begins service in a new airport, it raises the threat that Southwest 
will enter routes connecting that airport with other airports in its network.  We illustrate this in 
Figure I.  Southwest enters Washington Dulles in the fourth quarter of 2006 and immediately 
begins flights to Chicago Midway.  Southwest is already flying out of Cleveland to other points 
in its network besides Dulles.  Now, though, its entry into Dulles makes Southwest much more 
likely to start flying the IAD-CLE route in the near future.
6  Actually, even the announcement of 
the initial entry into Dulles ought to indicate to incumbents that the probability of future entry 
has risen. 
  Airport presence is a well known predictor of future route entry.
7  To verify the impact of 
                                                 
5 Southwest exited one airport during our sample, San Francisco International (SFO), in 2001.  It had operated there 
since before 1993. 
6 We used the local business press and press releases (via Lexis-Nexis) to confirm that Southwest did in fact start 
service at the airports where Southwest’s entry is indicated in the DB1A data.  We discovered through this search an 
important airport error in the DB1A data.  In several quarters, the DB1A source data indicates that Southwest 
operated flights out of Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport (DFW) in the late 1990s for a few quarters and then exited.  While 
the data show them flying from DFW to many different airports, the airline code for DFW must be mistaken.  There 
is no record of Southwest operating these numerous flights out of DFW in the local business press at the time or in 
other Department of Transportation data such as the T-100 (see the capacity section below) and the On-Time 
Performance Data.  We therefore dropped these DFW observations from the sample. 
7 See Bailey (1981) for a narrative of a particular episode where this idea was applied in antitrust policy toward the 
industry.  Empirical work that has used endpoint airport presence as a potential predictor of entry (albeit in the cross 
section rather than within particular markets over time) includes Berry (1992) and, in a similarly themed paper to 
ours, Peteraf and Reed (1994). 
  4having presence in both route endpoints in our own sample, we present in Table I the estimated 
marginal effects from a simple probit regression of whether Southwest starts flying a route in a 
given quarter, conditional on the number of endpoints at which Southwest is already operating in 
the previous quarter.  (Quarter dummies are also included in the regression.)  This is only a 
descriptive exercise, of course, not an explicit model of Southwest’s entry decision.  The results 
show that having a presence in one airport is correlated with a small but significantly higher 
probability of entry from the baseline probability (which is close to zero).  Having a presence in 
both airports, however, raises it by another factor of 70—to 18.5% per quarter. 
  At any point in time in our sample, we take the existing airport service network as given 
and look at incumbents’ fares on a route once it becomes clear that Southwest is looming as a 
competitor.  We capture the price responses to threatened entry using dummies in the quarters 
surrounding Southwest’s establishment of operations in both endpoint airports (but without 
flying the route) and control for actual entry with dummies in quarters during and after 
Southwest starts flying the route.  We restrict our attention to the major carriers operating during 
our sample: American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and US Airways. 
  We observe hundreds of routes threatened with entry over the period.  In most of these, 
Southwest eventually starts flying the route later in our sample; in others, Southwest establishes 
a presence in both airports but had not yet begun flying the route by the end of our observation 
period (up to three years later).  We exclude routes from our sample where Southwest establishes 
second endpoint airport presence simultaneously with actually flying the route.  In such cases we 
do not have a clear period to identify the heightened threat of entry separately from actual entry.  
We will, however, look at such routes below when discussing the issue of entry deterrence. 
  For each route in our sample, we look at the 25-quarter window surrounding the quarter 
  5in which Southwest establishes a presence in both endpoints (three years before to three years 
after) and define Southwest's actual entry as occurring when it establishes direct service—i.e., 
flights without a change of plane—between the two airports.
8  This follows the findings from 
U.S. antitrust authorities that non-stop service and connecting service be considered separate 
markets, or at least substantially differentiated products.  However, we did find similar results 
defining entry as also including change-of-plane service. 
In all, we observe Southwest threatening entry into 704 routes over the sample period, 
533 of which Southwest had actually entered with direct flights by the final quarter of 2004, the 
end of our observation period.  This yields over 19,000 route-carrier-quarter observations of 
average logged fares and passenger counts for major airlines’ direct flights on threatened routes.  
The standard deviation of average logged fares across observations is 0.45, and for logged 
passengers it is 2.02. 
 
III. Hypotheses and Empirical Specifications 
  Our baseline model measures the impact of Southwest establishing a presence in both 
endpoints of a route by looking at the periods before, during, and after this event, while 
controlling for other influences—like a standard event study.  The basic specification, with some 
slight abuse of summation notation as explained below, is as follows: 
()
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where yri,t is the outcome of interest (e.g., mean logged fares) for incumbent carrier i flying route 
                                                 
8 Several routes are not in the sample for the full 25-quarter period, either due to truncation at the beginning of the 
sample—we exclude any routes that are truncated by the end of the sample—or because the airline does not fly them 
during the entire window. 
  6r in quarter t.  
0 , __ _ rt SW in both airports τ +  are time dummies surrounding the period when 
Southwest establishes a presence in both endpoints of a route but without flying the route.  
, __
e rt SW flying route τ +  are time dummies that commence in the period Southwest actually starts 
flying the route.  The dummies are mutually exclusive, so the implied effects on the dependent 
variable given by their coefficients are not additive.  γri and μit are carrier-route and carrier-
quarter fixed effects, respectively.  Some specifications also include a set of controls Xri,t. 
In all regressions, we weight observations by the average number of passengers flying the 
route-carrier over the sample.  This allows us to measure the “aggregate” responses to 
Southwest’s entry (and is particularly important when looking at passenger volume responses, 
since logged passenger numbers are particularly volatile on low-traffic routes).  We also cluster 
the standard errors by route-carrier to account for intertemporal correlation in the error terms. 
The covariates of interest for determining the impact of threatened entry on incumbents' 
prices are the 
0 , __ _ rt SW in both airports τ +  coefficients.  We include these dummies for eight 
quarters prior to the quarter Southwest establishes dual endpoint presence on the threatened 
route, and for this establishment quarter (which we denote t0) itself.  We also include dummies 
for the two quarters after t0, and a single dummy for the period three or more quarters after t0.  
These post-t0 dummies only take a value of one if Southwest has not yet entered the route.  
Essentially, because we include route-carrier fixed effects in the regressions, reported 
coefficients show the relative sizes of the dependent variable in the dummy period relative to its 
average value in the excluded period between two and three years (that is, the 9
th through 12
th 
quarters) prior to t0. 
  As discussed above, the conventional, static-model view of threatened entry is that 
incumbents should not respond until they actually face competition.  This notion, in the spirit of 
  7the classic Chicago School critiques of limit pricing, is based on the seemingly simple 
proposition that incumbents should not cut prices before they have to.  Doing so entails losing 
profits in the short-run and has no impact on future profits.  This view implies that the 
coefficients on the entry threat period dummies should be zero. 
For preemptive action to be rational, there needs to be some mechanism tying 
Southwest's actions before Southwest enters to the market in later periods.  Incumbents might (as 
discussed in the literature cited above) be trying to deter entry or to accommodate entry but 
weaken the new entrant once it enters.  The difficulties of testing between various theories of 
strategic behavior are well known.  Nevertheless, we will offer at some suggestive evidence as to 
incumbents’ intentions for pre-emptive action.  We do not find evidence of strategic investment 
in excess capacity.  We also look at routes that Southwest has pre-committed to enter, finding 
suggestive, but not definitive, evidence that incumbents do not cut prices as aggressively until 
entry actually occurs. 
 
IV. Main Results: Documenting Preemptive Action 
Column (1) of Table II presents the results from estimating specification (1) using the 
average logged fares on incumbent carriers’ routes faced with the threat of entry by Southwest.  
Incumbent fares drop significantly before Southwest begins flying the route.  By the time 
Southwest starts operating on both sides of the route (period t0), prices are 17% lower (exp(-
0.186) = 0.830) than in the excluded period (recall that the coefficients show the value of average 
logged fares relative to their average over the 9
th through 12
th quarters before t0).  As time passes 
without Southwest entering, prices fall further.  On routes where Southwest threatens but does 
not enter for at least three quarters, fares are 24% below the excluded period, and are 
  8significantly lower than the average level at t0.
9
Prices are also lower in quarters before t0 than in the excluded period.  Imprecision in our 
estimates precludes pinning down an exact price breakpoint, but the patterns suggest prices begin 
to fall around the third quarter before t0.  A t0-3 breakpoint is bolstered by the fact the 
coefficients for t0-3 and t0-2 are significantly different at a five percent level from the average 
coefficients for periods t0-8, t0-7, and t0-6, while the t0-4 coefficient is not.  Regardless of the 
specific period, it is not surprising that prices begin to fall before t0.  The relevant time period 
should be when the incumbents first realize that Southwest's chances of entering a route have 
risen.  Southwest announces entry months before the entry actually occurs in order to advertise, 
sell tickets, hire workers, and such.  Southwest’s entry into Washington Dulles, for example, was 
publicly announced six months before the first day of operations.  (This lead time was typical of 
what we found in examining the business press for several such episodes in our sample.)  
Further, industry insiders are likely to find out about impending entries before the public 
announcement, as Southwest must negotiate gate leases with the airport authority and so on.
10
  Once Southwest actually enters the route at time te (seen in the table in the Southwest 
flying route coefficients), prices fall 21% below the baseline and then continue falling to over 
29% by the end of the period.  The entry-threat and actual-entry coefficients are not additive, so 
the price drop due to Southwest’s actual entry is the difference between the preemptive 17-
                                                 
9 This continued decline is not the subject of our analysis because it may reflect selection issues rather than strategic 
behavior.  If Southwest waits longer to enter routes where incumbents cut fares the most, this could skew the 
coefficients negative and provide a natural alternative explanation to the strategic view that Southwest’s entry 
hazard is increasing in the delay since entering the airport, thereby causing larger price cuts by the incumbents.  
10 This early response to impending discount carrier arrival at an airport is also supported by anecdotal evidence; 
Johnsson (2006) documents that the announcement that JetBlue would begin operating at Chicago O’Hare was 
greeted with fare cuts by American and United (the two incumbents with hubs at O’Hare) some months before 
JetBlue began operations. 
  9percent price drop and the ultimate 29% price drop.
11
  The results suggest preemptive price cuts are important.  More than half the total price 
effect that Southwest Airlines has on incumbents’ prices takes place before Southwest ever 
actually starts flying the route. 
  We deepen this initial analysis in several ways.  The first looks at the number of 
passengers flying on the incumbents’ threatened routes during this period of preemptive price 
cutting.  We expect the number of passengers flying on the incumbent carriers to rise in response 
to these lower prices.  Column (2) of Table II presents results where the log number of 
passengers is the dependent variable.  The estimates are imprecise, but the point estimates 
suggest that passenger traffic rises on threatened routes in the period before and around 
Southwest enters the second endpoint airport.  Comparing the fare and quantity changes from 
their baselines over the periods surrounding t0 suggests the magnitude of the quantity response is 
roughly twice that of the fare changes, suggesting a demand “elasticity” of around −1.
12  We will 
see below that an independent data source on passenger volumes documents similar quantity 
movements during the relevant time frame. 
  Our second expansion in the benchmark results considers the potential role of cost shocks 
as an alternative explanation.  For example, if Southwest chooses to enter airports where 
operating costs are falling, this will lead to a spurious correlation between our measure of 
                                                 
11 Notice that the te results reflect a convex combination of threatened and actual entry responses, since entry does 
not generally occur on the first day of the quarter.  Therefore some of the underlying microdata for the quarter 
reflect patterns prior to actual entry.  Also, while all of the post-entry coefficients correspond to periods after the 
price drops reflected in the threat of entry coefficients, the time difference between t0 and te varies across routes.  
Southwest actually enters some threatened routes one quarter after t0, others several quarters after, and still others it 
does not enter at all (at least by the end of our three year window).  The estimated impact of Southwest entry seen 
here is a bit smaller than that estimated in some previous work such as Morrison (2001).  In that case, though, he 
estimates fare impacts using fare variation across routes rather than within a route across time as we do here.  Our 
sample is also a selected one, since our results here exclude the routes that Southwest enters immediately.  (We do 
look at these immediate entry routes below when examining why preemptive actions occur.) 
12 This is not exactly a carrier-route specific elasticity, because we are not holding the prices of competitors fixed.  
  10Southwest's threat of entry and the decline in incumbents’ fares.  To account for such cost 
shocks, we control in the price regressions for the incumbents’ passenger-weighted average fares 
(normalized per mile to facilitate aggregation across routes) on other routes involving the same 
airports on one end but non-Southwest airports on the other. 
    We illustrate the principle behind the routes in control groups in Figure II.  In the 
Washington Dulles-Cleveland example, one control is the average logged fare on (say) United’s 
routes between IAD and airports to which Southwest doesn’t fly (we restrict alternative airports 
to those in the top 100 to be comparable), and the second is similarly defined for routes between 
CLE and non-Southwest airports.  These two sets of routes (referred to as the “operating cost 
controls” in the table) should embody any airport-specific operating cost shocks at either of the 
route’s endpoint airports.  Once they are controlled for, the observed price changes should then 
reflect the causal impact of Southwest’s threatened and actual entry. 
Column (3) of Table II shows the results of this specification.  The cost controls have 
significant and positive coefficients, as one would expect.  That is, when an incumbent’s fares 
rise on non-threatened routes from an airport, its fares also rise on the threatened route out of that 
city.  The rest of the coefficients in column (3) are slightly smaller in magnitude than in column 
(1), but still statistically significant and economically substantial—incumbent fares are down 
15% from the excluded period by t0, for example.  Most of the preemptive price cuts by the 
incumbents therefore appear to be restricted to the threatened routes from the airport.  
  We also check whether our results are somehow being driven by our choice of a three 
year event window or by the choice of the baseline comparison period.  In Table III we estimate 
a specification that expands the event window out to four years before t0 and breaks the timing 
dummies out to t0-14 (the excluded period is therefore the 15
th and 16
th quarters before t0).  The 
  11results are consistent with the baseline findings.  Prices begin to be significantly lower than the 
baseline period three quarters before t0, and fall more thereafter.  The magnitudes of the price 
drops are similar to the earlier results as well.
13
  Finally, we examine the passenger traffic when Southwest threatens entry to a 
metropolitan area’s secondary airport (which tend to exist only in the largest markets).  In such 
cases, the incumbents’ price cuts at the directly threatened (i.e., secondary) airport ought to draw 
passengers away from the main airport.  To examine this, we look specifically at routes flying 
out of LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark airports (when Southwest threatens entry into routes from 
Islip, Long Island), Miami (Southwest: Ft. Lauderdale), Reagan-National and Washington-
Dulles (Southwest: BWI; recall that the sample ends before Southwest’s entry into Dulles), 
Boston (Southwest: Providence and Manchester) and Chicago O’Hare (Southwest: Midway).  
We must exclude the Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston and Dallas markets from this 
regression because, during our sample period, Southwest operates in virtually all the airports in 
these metro areas or else regulation prevents competition.
14
  We date the entry threat from Southwest’s actions in the other airport.  So, for example, 
when Southwest starts operations in Orlando in 1994, they were operating on both endpoints of 
the Orlando-Chicago Midway route without flying the route itself.  Our previous results 
examined incumbent responses on the Orlando-Midway route; here we look at Orlando-O’Hare, 
even though Southwest does not fly to O’Hare. 
                                                 
13 An analogous specification using logged passenger traffic as the dependent variable gave qualitatively similar 
results. 
14 Southwest operates in the four largest Los Angeles airports: Burbank, Orange County, Ontario, and LAX.  Long 
Beach was the only neighboring airport it did not fly into and has only a tiny amount of incumbent major airline 
traffic in our sample.  In the San Francisco Bay area, Southwest operated in the Oakland, San Jose and San 
Francisco airports for most of our sample (until exiting from SFO in 2001).  Southwest operates in both Houston 
Hobby and Houston Intercontinental.  In Dallas, flights from Love field to anywhere but Alabama, Arkansas, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas were prohibited by law during our sample, so 
competition with DFW is quite limited. 
  12    Columns (1) and (2) of Table IV looks at the prices and passenger counts, respectively, of 
incumbents on these nearby but not threatened routes.  There are no significant patterns in either 
series.  Coefficients on the time dummies tend to be small and magnitude and occasionally 
alternate signs.  It is worth noting that the major incumbents at the Southwest airport and at the 
nearby airport may not be the same, so we are not strictly comparing the actions of the same 
airlines across the two sets of routes.  In Chicago, for example, Continental and Northwest are 
incumbents with substantial operations at Midway while United flies exclusively out of O’Hare. 
  Taken together, the results in this section suggest that incumbents do engage in 
preemptive price cutting when they find out Southwest is likely to enter a route in the near 
future.  In the next section we examine some evidence regarding what they are trying to 
accomplish by doing so. 
 
V. Reasons for Preemptive Action: Deterrence, Capacity, Accommodation 
  The evidence documenting the existence of preemptive price cutting by incumbent 
airlines is much easier to establish than the reasoning behind it—especially when we lack access 
to important data such as the fare class of the ticket, the type of passenger, whether they are 
frequent flyers and so on.  However, we can at least provide a few suggestive pieces of evidence 
that may indicate support for some theories at the expense of others. 
 
A. Strategic Investment in Excess Capacity 
We first test whether incumbents’ actions reflect strategic investment in excess capacity, 
as in Dixit (1979) and others.  Unfortunately, the DB1A files making up our core sample are of 
passenger itineraries, not flights, so they cannot speak to capacity issues like seats or flights 
  13available.  We can get this type of information, however, from the T-100 data of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation.  The T-100 contains the number of passengers, flights, and 
available seats by segment-carrier-month; we aggregate by route-carrier-quarter to match our 
DB1A-based data though there are many more missing observations in the T-100. 
Two problems arise in comparing the T-100 data to our core sample.  The first is that the 
T-100 data is based on segments (any airport-to-airport trip by an aircraft) rather than itineraries 
(defined by origin and destination city regardless of any intermediate stopovers) as in the DB1A.  
The T-100 will count one-stop flights with no plane change as two separate segments, while the 
DB1A would consider this a single, direct flight.  Second, the T-100 has poor coverage of 
segments with few passengers.  Of the 19,414 direct flight route-carrier-quarters in our DB1A 
sample, only 3,152 have matches in the T-100.  Segment traffic appears to start, stop, and start 
again in the T-100 even if continuous in the DB1A.  This coverage gap is clearly concentrated in 
the smallest routes, however.  While the T-100 data contain only about one-sixth of the route-
carrier-quarters in our DB1A sample, they cover 90% of the total passengers.  Since our 
regressions are weighted by passenger traffic, the impact of the coverage gap should be 
mitigated. 
Column (1) of Table V shows logged passenger responses for route-carrier-quarters.  
Although noisy, the point estimates from this independent passenger-quantity data suggest the 
same general pattern of rising traffic around the period that the threat of entry rises (save for an 
anomalous coefficient in quarter t0-2).  Columns (2) and (3) show two measures of incumbent 
capacity on threatened routes: the logged number of seats available (column (2)) and the logged 
number of flights (column (3)). We cannot definitively rule out a rise in capacity given the point 
estimates and the coefficients’ precision, but there is no indication at conventional significance 
  14levels that either available seats or the number of flights rise.  Further, we look in column (4) at 
what happens to the log of the load factor (the share of available seats on the flights that had 
passengers in them).  Here there is statistically significant evidence that, whatever is going on 
with the number of seats or flights, there are significantly more passengers per unit of capacity 
when the entry threat materializes.  This is not consistent with the use of capacity investment as a 
pre-emptive action. 
 
B. Entry Deterrence or Accommodation? 
The other basic issue we may have some ability to address in our data is whether 
incumbents cut prices early to deter Southwest’s entry on a route, or instead to try to soften 
competition once entry occurs—i.e., whether they are engaging in deterrence or accommodation.   
To test this, we compare preemptive behavior on the routes in our basic sample—where 
Southwest's future entry behavior is unknown and could in principle be deterred—to the pricing 
behavior of incumbents on a set of routes where Southwest's entry is pre-announced and 
therefore all but guaranteed.  In the spirit of Dafny (2005) and Ellison and Ellison (2007), if 
entry deterrence is the motivation, we should not see price cutting where deterrence is 
impossible. 
The routes where deterrence seems extremely unlikely are those where Southwest begins 
direct service between two endpoint airports in the same quarter it starts operating in the second 
endpoint airport.  Using the example of Southwest’s entry into Washington Dulles, these would 
be routes that Southwest immediately begins flying on October 5, 2006, like Dulles to Chicago 
Midway.  In principle, Southwest might still be deterred from entering these routes even though 
they are pre-announced, but we are unaware of any cases in our sample where Southwest 
  15announced they would enter a route and did not.  There are 223 such routes in our data; we 
observe them for roughly 6,400 route-carrier-quarter observations. 
The results from this no-deterrence-motive sample are shown in column (2) of Table VI.  
The coefficients show no significant fare declines before Southwest’s actual entry, as compared 
to the substantial drops in the benchmark specification (shown in column (1) for comparison 
purposes; note that because entry is immediate in the column (2) sample, t0 and te are 
synonymous, and the threatened entry dummies for periods after t0 do not exist).  Thus when 
there is no such possibility of deterrence, as on the routes in this sample, incumbents take at best 
modest action.  This suggests their actions in threatened routes are driven by their hopes of 
deterring Southwest from entry.  We are reluctant to make too much out of this finding, however.  
We estimated a fully-interacted model that allowed us to test for the significance of differences 
between the two samples, and could not reject equality among any of the pairs of time dummy 
coefficients at the ten percent level, except at quarter t0-7, well before Southwest enters.  It 
appears that the data are too thin here to speak definitively toward incumbents’ motives. 
The manner through which either deterrent or accommodative price cuts might operate is 
an open question.  A commonly postulated mechanism through which preemptive behavior 
would operate involves “dynamic demand”: customer loyalty or similar mechanisms that make 
demand today not just a function of today’s prices, but previous prices as well.  One plausible 
explanation in this vein for the observed preemptive price cutting is that it reflects efforts by 
incumbents to generate loyalty or lock-in among existing valuable customers, making them less 
likely to switch to Southwest should it enter.  The consumer loyalty might be as direct as 
something like frequent flyer programs but it could certainly be less tangible than that; all that is 
  16required is that it can be built through price cuts.
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VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
  This paper has looked at the response of incumbent major airlines to the threat of entry by 
examining how the incumbents respond when Southwest starts operating in the airports on both 
ends of a route but before it actually starts flying that route.  The nature of Southwest’s network 
means that the likelihood of their entering such a route rises dramatically when Southwest 
announces operations will begin in the second endpoint airport, thus generating a discrete change 
in incumbents’ expectations about the likelihood of new competition through entry.   
  The results indicate that incumbents do indeed react preemptively to Southwest’s entry 
threat.  Incumbents drop fares significantly before entry occurs.  This does not appear to be 
driven by airport-specific cost shocks; incumbents’ fares drop on threatened routes relative to 
their fares on other routes from the same airports.  The fare declines appear to be accompanied 
by an increase in passenger traffic on the incumbents’ threatened routes.  They do not extend to 
routes into neighboring airports in the same MSA where Southwest is not directly threatening 
                                                 
15 Discussions of the role of consumer loyalty and lock-in for the airline industry can be found in work such as 
Cairns and Galbraith (1990), Borenstein (1996), and Lederman (2007).  As Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) 
point out, given the complementarity between current and past consumption in dynamic demand functions, lowering 
prices today to stimulate current and future demand will be less effective (and even possibly entirely ineffective) if 
the firm cannot commit to keeping prices low in the future: consumers rationally infer that building a current 
consumption stock today might allow firms to extract more surplus from them tomorrow.  This price commitment 
issue does seem to apply to the airline industry.  However, it is still plausible—and the empirical evidence seems to 
bear this out—that the direct demand-enhancing effect outweighs consumers’ wariness with respect to airlines future 
price commitments.  Unfortunately, as stated above, conclusively testing this or any other story of dynamic demand 
driving preemptive fare cuts requires detailed information on passengers’ histories with particular airlines, ticket 
search behaviors, or frequent flyer program status.  The sensitive nature of this sort of information means it is not 
readily available for even an individual carrier’s passengers, much less at a comprehensive, industry-wide level.  A 
more suggestive approach we used in an earlier draft was to see how fare cuts varied between routes that are likely 
to have different concentrations of business travelers, who are the heaviest users of loyalty programs.  We found that 
leisure routes, defined either via the importance of the hotel industry in the states of their endpoint airports (as in 
Borenstein [1989]) or through temperature differences across endpoint cities (Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller [1992]), 
saw smaller price declines than routes likely to have higher relative levels of business traffic.  While certainly not 
conclusive, these results are consistent with incumbents making efforts to raise loyalty among their business-travel 
customers in order to reduce the probability that they lose them if Southwest enters. 
  17entry. 
Beyond the fact of preemptive action, there is some suggestive evidence on why such 
action takes place.  In particular, there does not seem to be much significant evidence in favor of 
strategic investment in excess capacity.  A comparison of incumbents’ actions on threatened 
routes to their behavior on routes where entry deterrence is impossible suggests that incumbents 
may be using the preemptive actions to deter Southwest, though at the same time we cannot 
reject the possibility of accommodation. 
This paper’s findings suggest the documented powerful competitive effect Southwest 
Airlines has in the U.S. passenger airline industry does not operate solely through Southwest’s 
head-to-head competition with major carriers.  Merely the threat of competing with Southwest is 
enough to induce substantial fare reductions from major carriers.  We have focused on this 
industry in particular because it offers a good setting to empirically identify the causes and 
effects of interest, and to therefore add to the still sparse empirical literature on the threat of 
entry.  If the response of incumbents here is anything like the responses in other industries, the 
study of preemption and customer loyalty may be fruitful avenues for future empirical research. 
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 Table I 
Probability of Southwest’s Entry into a Route 
 
 










Notes: The table shows marginal effects estimates from a probit estimation for Southwest’s entry into a route in a 
particular quarter, conditional on the number of the route’s endpoint airports served by Southwest in the previous 
quarter.  The excluded category includes observations where Southwest does not serve either endpoint airport in the 
previous quarter.  Quarter fixed effects are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 Table II 
Incumbent Responses to the Threat of Entry 
 































































































Southwest in both airports (no flights) 















Southwest flying route 







Southwest flying route 







Operating cost control, 
endpoint airport 1     0.106 
(0.065) 
Operating cost control, 
endpoint airport 2     0.158** 
(0.048) 
N 19,414  19,414  18,176 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the passenger-weighted average logged fares.  In column (2) 
it is logged total passengers.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route-carrier.  The sample 
includes all routes where Southwest threatens entry as defined in the text.  The “Southwest in both airports” 
 dummies denote Southwest having flights involving airports on both ends of a route previous to actually flying the 
route.  The “Southwest flying route” dummies denote Southwest actually operating flights on the route.   
 Table III 
Baseline Estimates with a Longer Event Window and a Finer Time Gradation 
 
 Dependent  Variable: ln(p) 











































t0+3 to t0+12 
 
Southwest flying route 
te
te+1 to te+2 





























 N  20,979 
 
Notes: This table shows estimates from passenger-weighted average logged fares for our baseline sample, but with 
an expanded event window (see text for details).  All regressions include route-carrier and carrier-quarter fixed 
effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route-carrier.  See also Table II notes for variable 
definitions. 
 
 Table IV 












































































Southwest in both airports (no flights) 











Southwest flying route 





Southwest flying route 





N  16,510 16,510 
  
Notes: All regressions are weighted by passengers and include route-carrier and carrier-quarter fixed effects.  The 
table shows incumbents’ price and quantity responses on routes to neighboring airports to which Southwest does not 
fly but that are in the same market as a Southwest airport.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by 
route-carrier.  The dependent variables are route-carrier’s average logged fares during the quarter in column (1) and 
its logged number of passengers in column (2).  See also Table II notes for variable definitions.   
 
 Table V 






























































































































Southwest in both airports (no flights)



















Southwest flying route 









Southwest flying route 









N 3,152  3,152  3,152  3,152 
 
Notes: All regressions are weighted by passengers and include route-carrier and carrier-quarter fixed effects.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route-carrier.  The dependent variable in column (1) is the 
log number of passengers.  The dependent variable in (2) is the log of the total number of seats available on the 
route.  In (3) it is the log number of flights actually flown.  In (4) it is the share of the seats flown that are filled with 
passengers.  The specifications use the T-100 data, as explained in the text.  See also Table II notes for variable 
definitions. 
 
 Table VI 
Deterrence versus Accommodation: Price Response on Routes Where Southwest's Entry Date is 
Pre-Announced 
 




Dependent Variable: ln(p)  ln(p) 
















































Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0
-0.186** 
(0.073)   
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0+1 
-0.215** 
(0.073)   
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0+2 
-0.228** 
(0.075)   
Southwest in both airports (no flights) 
t0+3 to t0+12 
-0.277** 
(0.079)   






Southwest flying route 





Southwest flying route 





N 19,414  6,423 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is the passenger-weighted average logged fares.  Standard errors are 
in parentheses and are clustered by route-carrier.  The sample in column (1) is the same as the baseline sample from 
Table II.  The sample in column (2) includes all routes where Southwest begins flying the route simultaneously with 
entering the second airport.  In such circumstances, of course, t0 and te are the same and there are no periods after t0 
where Southwest is not yet flying the route so those coefficients are left out of the specification.  
 Figure I 
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Southwest threatens entry here 
when they start operations in 
both endpoint airports 
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Airport 1 alternate routes 
Airport 2 alternate routes 
 
 
 
 